You Can Read It In The Sunday Papers

DoomingDemocracy
DueToDestabilizationVille

Emptywheel, who has long had her eye on what just may be the most dangerous regime in the Middle East, points out that the infamous "cut-out strategy" is once again being used by the Cheney Administration in an attempt to get out in front of public opinion without actually going public.

And this time the anonymous leakers/sources are being used to float the notion that democratic change in Pakistan could lead to disaster in America's most influential Sunday Papers.

Why?

Because, the anonymous reasoning goes, the "strength" of Pervez Musharraf is the only thing keeping rogue elements in Pakistan's military from giving nuclear bombs to terrorists.

To see how this works, all you have to do is count the number of times the NY Times' David Sanger cites government "weakness" as a co-conspirator in the nuclear smuggling activities of the father of the Pakistani bomb, A.Q. Khan.

Number 1:
He (Musharraf) also talked about new physical controls over Pakistan’s many nuclear facilities, including the laboratories that were once the playground of Abdul Qadeer Khan, the national hero who established Pakistan as the hub of the biggest proliferation network in nuclear history. The leaking of much of the technology to Iran, North Korea and Libya, starting in the late 1980s, often coincided with times of political turmoil when Pakistan’s leadership was weak and its attention elsewhere.

Number 2
Dr. Khan did just that. Some of his most profitable moments, including sales of centrifuge technology to Iran that the International Atomic Energy Agency is still investigating, took place at moments of great government weakness in Pakistan.

Number 3:
In retrospect, it is clear that Dr. Khan’s proliferation business thrived when Pakistan’s leadership was at its weakest and most corrupt.

Number 4:
And the Khan network started doing business with Libya in 1997, just as Islamabad was consumed with political jockeying that involved the generals and Nawaz Sharif, the prime minister whom Mr. Musharraf overthrew two years later.


Now that last one doesn't actually use the term "weakness". Instead it implies that a stabilizing "strength" only came with the Mr. Musharraf's coup.

Why, in the Cheneyite scheme of things at least, is that important?

Because, according to Jon Stewart's favorite moustachioed Strangelovian Neandercon, Mr. Musharraf is our only hope:

John R. Bolton, the former United Nations representative who has accused Mr. Bush of going soft on proliferation, said more bluntly that General Musharraf’s survival was critical. “While Pervez Musharraf might not be a Jeffersonian democrat,” Mr. Bolton said, “he is the best bet to secure the nuclear arsenal.”


Which is a conclusion that Mr. Sanger seems to buy into as well when he says:

It was General Musharraf who finally confronted Dr. Khan — after he had consolidated power, and, conveniently for the Pakistani military, after Pakistan itself had become a nuclear power.

However, as Empty Wheel points out, there is something about the relationship between Mr. Musharraf and Mr. Khan that Mr. Sanger fails to mention.

And that is the fact that Mr. M. recently released Mr. K. from "house arrest" after never letting American officials speak to him directly.

Which is interesting in the extreme.

Especially when you compare the treatment of Mr. Khan, someone who is really and truly dangerous, to that of, say, Mahrer Arar.

Now, if you'll excuse me, I'm going to go listen to a little more Joe Jackson.

OK?